A Russian perspective on the Ukrainian conflict.

NATO promise: "not one inch eastward"

From a Russian perspective, the 1990 promise that NATO would move “not one inch eastward” was a key assurance given in exchange for allowing German reunification. Though not formalized, Russia saw later NATO expansion as a betrayal of that understanding and a sign of Western exploitation during its post-Soviet weakness. This perceived broken promise has fueled deep mistrust and shaped Russia’s assertive foreign policy ever since.

Henry Kissinger & Jack Matlock confimation

A confirmation of the promise can be seen later on television in a discussion between H. Kissinger and J. Matlock on PBS newshour in which they discuss the future of NATO. In the following video this confirmation can be seen starting from 11:45.

Video link: Youtube

Why NATO expansion matters to Russia

From Russia's perspective, NATO expansion isn't just a political issue — it's a direct threat to its national security and long-term strategic stability. One of the core concerns is that as NATO moves closer to Russian borders, it could one day undermine Russia's nuclear deterrent, which is central to the doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD).

MAD relies on both sides maintaining the ability to launch a devastating second strike, even after being attacked. If NATO were to deploy advanced missile defense systems, hypersonic weapons, or first-strike capabilities in new member states near Russia, it could, in theory, reduce Russia's ability to retaliate. This possibility creates the fear that technological advances, combined with geographic proximity, might eventually neutralize Russia’s nuclear shield.

For example, intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) launched from the continental U.S. give Russia roughly 30 minutes to detect, confirm, and respond — enough time for leadership to act. But if similar weapons or strike systems were stationed in countries near Russia's border, such as in the Baltics or Eastern Europe, the warning time could drop to just a few minutes. A surprise strike might wipe out Russia’s command structure, including Moscow's leadership, before a counter-strike could even be ordered.

For Russia, then, NATO’s growth isn’t just about losing influence in Eastern Europe — it's also about protecting the credibility of its nuclear deterrent and preventing a future where it could be strategically outmatched or even disarmed.

In other words, Russia perceives this threat as existential.

USSR officially dissolves

On December 25, 1991, Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev resigned, declaring the office extinct and transferring power to Russian President Boris Yeltsin. The next day, December 26, the Supreme Soviet formally dissolved the Soviet Union, ending its existence after nearly 70 years. Fifteen former republics became independent states.

Russia, formal successor of USSR

Russia assumed the Soviet Union's permanent seat on the UN Security Council. This transition was supported by the other former Soviet republics through the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) agreement, which endorsed Russia's continuation of the USSR's international roles.

Later, in April 1992, Russia declared itself the sole legal successor to all debts of the former USSR and pledged to repay them in full, while receiving rights to all financial and material assets of the USSR.

These recognitions and agreements solidified Russia's status as the primary continuator state of the Soviet Union in the eyes of NATO members and the international community.

Ukraine

Ukraine became an independent state in 1991, confirmed by a national referendum. The country inherited a significant portion of the Soviet military, including a large nuclear arsenal, strategic bombers, and missile systems. However, these weapons remained under Soviet-designed command and control systems, limiting Ukraine’s independent operational use.

At the time, approximately 51.45 million people found themselves living in a newly independent country without ever having moved. Of these, 22.1% — around 11.37 million — identified as ethnic Russians. Culturally, Ukrainians and Russians were very close: the majority of Ukrainians spoke Russian fluently, and many ethnic Ukrainians even considered Russian their primary language. Source: U.S. Bureau of Census

At the time, Ukrainians and Russians often saw each other as "brothers" — connected by shared Slavic roots, intertwined histories, and a common language. Many families had relatives across both countries, and people moved freely between them, often without feeling they were crossing into a different nation.

The Budapest Memorandum

Ukraine signs the Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances, alongside the United States, the United Kingdom, and Russia. In this agreement, Ukraine agreed to give up its inherited Soviet nuclear arsenal — the third-largest in the world at the time — and accede to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as a non-nuclear state.

In return, the signatory countries pledged to:

• Respect Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty, and existing borders
• Refrain from the threat or use of force against Ukraine
• Avoid economic coercion
• Seek UN Security Council action if Ukraine became a victim of aggression involving nuclear weapons

It’s important to note that the Budapest Memorandum was a political agreement, not a legally binding treaty, and it did not include specific enforcement mechanisms. Nevertheless, it was seen as a major diplomatic step in reducing nuclear risk after the Cold War and securing Ukraine’s sovereignty in exchange for disarmament.

Pressure from the west

Surprisingly to some, it was actually the U.S. and U.K. who were leading advocates of the NPT agreement. In their eyes, allowing a new country like Ukraine to keep nuclear weapons would set a dangerous precedent and risk global nuclear instability. Their goal was to prevent the emergence of new nuclear-armed states after the Cold War. Western powers worried that a nuclear-armed Ukraine could trigger a regional arms race, strain relations with Russia, or even result in a future conflict involving nuclear weapons — especially since Ukraine was economically and politically unstable at the time.

Source: arms control

Ukrainian independence, a key point

From the Russian perspective, the Budapest Memorandum was signed under the assumption that Ukraine would remain a neutral, independent state, not aligned with hostile military blocs like NATO. Russia agreed to respect Ukraine's sovereignty and borders, but viewed this as part of a post-Cold War security balance where Ukraine would act as a buffer state, not a forward base for Western alliances.

While the memorandum does not explicitly prohibit Ukraine from joining NATO, Russian officials have long argued that NATO expansion into Ukraine violates the spirit of the agreement and broader post-Cold War understandings — including the informal assurances made in the early 1990s that NATO would not expand eastward.

In this view, Ukrainian independence is conditional on it being genuinely sovereign, not under Western military influence. From Moscow’s standpoint, once Ukraine began openly pursuing NATO membership, it was no longer acting as a neutral state, and thus Russia saw the original security framework — including the Budapest Memorandum — as undermined.

NATO-Russia founding act

NATO and Russia sign the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security in Paris. This agreement aimed to establish a framework for peaceful relations and mutual trust following the Cold War, especially as NATO expanded into Eastern Europe.

Key points included:

• A commitment to view each other as partners, not adversaries
• A pledge by NATO not to station substantial combat forces permanently in new member states near Russia
• The creation of the NATO-Russia Council for ongoing dialogue and cooperation
• A shared commitment to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all European states

Russia feared that NATO’s expansion would eventually bring Western military infrastructure closer to its borders, threatening its strategic balance — despite NATO's pledge not to station "substantial combat forces" in new member states. Many in the Russian leadership and military saw the act as symbolic and doubted NATO’s intentions. They believed NATO would continue to expand and ignore Russian interests over time. The treaty was seen as a way to limit the damage, not endorse NATO enlargement.

Russian default

Russia defaults on its domestic debt, devalues the Ruble, and freezes some foreign debt payments. The crisis was driven by low oil prices, fiscal mismanagement, and fallout from the Asian financial crisis. It triggered a sharp economic collapse and widespread financial instability.

Cultural implication

The Russian default had deep cultural effects beyond economics. It shattered public trust in government and financial institutions, reinforcing a sense of instability that had lingered since the Soviet collapse. Many Russians lost their savings overnight, leading to disillusionment, cynicism, and a nostalgia for the perceived stability of the Soviet era. The crisis also fed into a broader narrative of national humiliation, fueling skepticism toward Western economic models and deepening the desire for a strong, centralized leadership — sentiments that would later shape support for Vladimir Putin’s rise.

Vladimir Putin officially becomes president

Vladimir Putin became Acting President on December 31, 1999, after Boris Yeltsin unexpectedly resigned, and was officially elected on March 26, 2000, taking office on May 7, 2000. His rise occurred during a period of deep internal crisis: the 1998 financial default had devastated the Russian economy, public confidence in liberal democracy was eroding, and the war in Chechnya had reignited. Many Russians were looking for stability, order, and national pride — and Putin’s image as a decisive, disciplined former intelligence officer matched the moment.

Putin's ascent marked a turning point in Russia’s posture toward the West, especially NATO. While Yeltsin had tolerated NATO expansion with frustration, Putin viewed it as a clear strategic threat. He saw NATO’s moves — especially its 1999 intervention in Yugoslavia without UN approval — as proof that the alliance would act unilaterally, even against states aligned with Russia. His presidency signaled the beginning of a more assertive and security-driven Russian foreign policy, grounded in the belief that the West was encroaching on Russia’s traditional sphere of influence.

Putin's rise thus reshaped Russia’s trajectory: from a chaotic, Western-leaning state under Yeltsin to a more centralized, nationalist, and security-focused power determined to push back against NATO’s presence in Eastern Europe.

Orange revolution, first Maidan

The Orange Revolution in Ukraine took place in late 2004 after widespread reports of fraud in the presidential election between pro-Russian Viktor Yanukovych and pro-Western Viktor Yushchenko. Massive peaceful protests erupted across the country, with demonstrators demanding fair elections. The movement gained its name from Yushchenko’s campaign color — orange. Ukraine's Supreme Court annulled the fraudulent results and ordered a new vote, which Yushchenko won. The revolution marked a major shift toward democratic activism and worsened tensions with Russia, which saw it as Western-backed interference.

U.S. Involvement

The Orange Revolution can be considered as the first proxy clash between the United States and Russia on Ukrainian soil. Substantial evidence exists that the U.S. played an active role in supporting democratic institutions, civil society, and media in Ukraine in the lead-up to the 2004 presidential election. The U.S. reportedly invested around $65 million over two years to promote electoral transparency and civic engagement. Organizations such as USAID, the National Democratic Institute (NDI), and Freedom House provided resources, training, and funding to local activists, journalists, and election observers.

Prominent figures like Adrian Karatnycky of Freedom House were involved in organizing observer missions and training sessions for Ukrainian civil society groups. These efforts were supported by international experts, including veterans of Serbia’s Otpor movement, known for their role in the ousting of Slobodan Milošević.

While the West framed these actions as support for democracy, Russia interpreted them as coordinated foreign interference, aimed at pulling Ukraine into the Western geopolitical sphere. The Orange Revolution thus became a major flashpoint in East-West relations and a precedent for future confrontations over Ukraine’s political alignment.

Source: Wikipedia – Orange Revolution

A Divided Victory for Yushchenko

In the rerun of Ukraine’s 2004 presidential election, Viktor Yushchenko won with only 52% of the vote, exposing a deeply divided nation. While Western observers celebrated the outcome as a triumph for democracy, the narrow margin made it clear that nearly half of Ukrainians supported Viktor Yanukovych, the pro-Russian candidate. His strongholds were in eastern and southern Ukraine, regions where Russian language, identity, and cultural ties remained dominant. This electoral split highlighted a core division within Ukrainian society — between the pro-European west and the pro-Russian east. Rather than resolving the country’s geopolitical orientation, the Orange Revolution revealed how contested and fragile Ukraine’s national unity truly was.

NATO Bucharest Summit

From Russia’s perspective, the 2008 NATO Bucharest Summit marked a serious escalation in East-West tensions. Although Ukraine and Georgia were not granted immediate membership, NATO's declaration that both countries “will become members” was seen in Moscow as a direct threat to Russian security.

President Vladimir Putin, who attended the summit as an observer, strongly opposed NATO’s eastward expansion and warned that Ukrainian membership, in particular, would cross a red line. Russia viewed the statement as a violation of previous understandings that NATO would not expand into former Soviet republics. The summit confirmed long-standing Russian fears that the West was encroaching on its traditional sphere of influence, and it contributed to the Kremlin’s more aggressive stance in the region.

Georgia - Russia conflict

the conflict began when Georgia launched a surprise military assault on the breakaway region of South Ossetia on the night of August 7, shelling its capital, Tskhinvali, and causing civilian and peacekeeper casualties — including deaths among Russian personnel stationed there. Russia viewed this as an act of aggression against its peacekeeping mission and Russian citizens, many of whom had been granted Russian passports in previous years.

Moscow responded by rapidly deploying troops into South Ossetia and launching a military campaign that pushed deep into Georgian territory. Russia framed its actions as a legitimate response to protect civilians and restore peace, emphasizing that it was Georgia, not Russia, that initiated full-scale hostilities. The war confirmed for Russia the danger of NATO-aligned governments on its borders and was seen as a warning to the West about further interference in what Moscow considers its strategic neighborhood.

EU Official Stance

Initially, many Western governments and media outlets condemned Russia’s actions, portraying Moscow as the aggressor. The United States in particular defended Georgia, accusing Russia of overreach and power projection. However, a formal EU-sponsored investigation, led by Swiss diplomat Heidi Tagliavini and published in September 2009, later concluded that it was Georgia that started the war, launching the first full-scale military attack.

"Russia was not the aggressor and reacted to the war started by Saakashvili. He knew full well when he implemented his reunification programme that he was facing an all-powerful adversary... Russia’s reaction was doubtless excessive, but was taken in accordance with international law in a so-called self-defence situation." — Franz Obermayr, Member of European Parliament Source: Europarl

The EU investigation acknowledged that Russia's response went beyond proportional self-defense, especially by advancing into undisputed Georgian territory. Still, the core finding remained that Georgia initiated the conflict, and that Russia responded — albeit forcefully — to that first strike and within international law.

Source: Reuters – EU Report

Viktor Yanukovych elected in Ukraine

In February 2010, Viktor Yanukovych narrowly defeated Yulia Tymoshenko in Ukraine’s presidential runoff, returning to power after his earlier defeat during the 2004 Orange Revolution. His victory marked a significant political shift. His background and support base were rooted in eastern Ukraine, where Russian language and economic ties to Russia were strongest.

As president, Yanukovych pivoted Ukraine away from NATO ambitions, declaring Ukraine a non-aligned nation by law in 2010. This move was welcomed by Moscow and signaled an end to the pro-NATO policies of his predecessor, Viktor Yushchenko.

Though Yanukovych initially kept the door open to EU cooperation, he slowed EU integration efforts, reducing reforms required for the EU Association Agreement, while simultaneously deepening ties with Russia — both economically and politically.

Viktor Yanukovych’s 2010 Campaign Promises

During the 2010 presidential election, Viktor Yanukovych campaigned on a platform emphasizing stability, economic revival, and a balanced foreign policy. Below are his key promises:

1. European Integration

Yanukovych pledged to continue Ukraine's path toward European integration, asserting that Ukraine should be part of Europe.

“We decided that our main goal will be integration in Europe at the first congress in 1997, and in all these years we not only never changed our program, we are even more convinced that Ukraine should be a part of Europe.” — Viktor Yanukovych, 2008 Source: Foreign Policy

2. Non-Alignment and NATO Opposition

He advocated for Ukraine's non-aligned status, opposing NATO membership while maintaining partnerships with both East and West.

Source: Reuters

3. Economic Revival and Stability

Yanukovych promised to revive the economy, create jobs, and improve living standards, especially in the industrial eastern regions.

4. Russian Language Rights

He proposed enhancing the status of the Russian language, including making it a regional language where Russian speakers were the majority.

5. Anti-Corruption and Governance Reform

He pledged to fight corruption and improve state efficiency.

U.S. interference

There is little to no evidence of U.S. interference in this particular election. If any influence existed, it was not public or overt, with no prominent U.S. officials, politicians, or public figures traveling to Ukraine or openly campaigning for the pro-Western side.

Vilnius summit - suspension of Association Agreement

Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych abruptly suspends preparations for signing the EU Association Agreement (AA), which includes a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA), just days before its expected signing at the Vilnius Summit (November 28–29).

A significant portion of Ukraine’s population, particularly in the pro-Russian eastern and southern regions, opposed the agreement, fearing economic disruption from reduced trade with Russia and loss of preferential energy prices. Moscow had warned that the EU deal would force Ukraine to choose between Europe and Russia, and in response, Russia applied economic pressure, including trade restrictions and offers of financial aid, to persuade Kiev to reconsider. Yanukovych’s suspension of the AA was thus framed as a pragmatic move to avoid splitting the country and maintain stability in line with the interests of Ukraine’s Russian-speaking and pro-Russian communities.

A divided stance

There was no absolute majority either in favor of or against Ukraine’s integration into the European Union at the time. Polls conducted by KIIS, the Razumkov Centre, Research & Branding Group, and the Sociological Group "RATING" consistently showed that support for the EU Association Agreement (AA) ranged between 40% and 49%, falling short of an absolute majority.

At the same time, the same polling data indicated that 39% of respondents believed the terms of the AA were economically unfavorable for Ukraine, while only 30% viewed the terms as favorable.

It is important to note that sourcing reliable, unbiased data from this period is challenging. The issue was highly politicized, and many sources have been revised or selectively reported in favor of western Ukrainian views in the aftermath of the 2013–2014 political crisis.

What remains clear, however, is that the country was deeply divided with two opposing and incompatible views about the future of Ukraine. These divisions laid the groundwork for the political upheaval and eventual armed conflict that followed.

Source: Wikipedia

Russian Economic Concerns

In the lead-up to the Vilnius Summit, Russia exerted economic pressure to prevent Ukraine from signing the EU Association Agreement (AA) — a move widely criticized in the West. However, from the Russian perspective, this pressure was not arbitrary or baseless.

• Ukraine was heavily dependent on Russian gas and energy supplies, and by late 2013, it had accumulated $3–4 billion in debt. Signing the AA would have invalidated preferential pricing agreements, forcing Russia to treat Ukraine as any other third-party country. This included the likely end of gas subsidies, which had kept energy prices low for Ukraine.

• At the time, Russia was Ukraine’s largest trading partner. Moscow viewed the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) with the EU as incompatible with Ukraine’s existing economic agreements with Russia and the CIS. Russia warned that joining the EU trade regime would require severing those ties, leading to economic disruption on both sides.

• Russia feared that the move would cripple eastern Ukraine’s industrial base, where factories were deeply integrated into Russian supply chains. A collapse of this sector would not only harm Ukraine, but also impact Russian industries tied to it.

• From Moscow’s point of view, the EU Association Agreement was presented as a Western ultimatum or zero-sum choice — Ukraine was being forced to choose between Russia and the West, severing ties with one or the other, undermining the notion of neutrality, true sovereignty and balanced diplomacy.

• Russia also expressed concern for the Russian-speaking population in eastern Ukraine, many of whom felt culturally and economically closer to Russia. There was a belief that these communities would be marginalized under a pro-European shift.

• In contrast to the EU’s conditional approach, Russia offered Ukraine a $15 billion loan package, positioning itself as a reliable and immediate economic partner willing to support Ukraine’s stability without imposing ideological conditions.

From Russia’s perspective, these actions were not coercion but rational efforts to protect economic ties, regional stability, and the interests of millions of people closely linked to Russia by history, language, and industry.

Start of (second) Maidan

The first Maidan protests began on the same day President Yanukovych suspended preparations for the EU Association Agreement. Initially peaceful and student-led, the protests called for European integration and democratic reforms. Over time, the movement grew in size and significance, eventually becoming known as Euromaidan, the Maidan Revolution, or the Revolution of Dignity.

Protests expand and violence intensifies

Following a violent police crackdown on November 30, protests rapidly expanded across Ukraine. On December 1, over 200,000 people gathered in Kiev, marking a major turning point in the movement. Demonstrators occupied government buildings, including Kiev City Hall, and began establishing permanent camps in Independence Square. The protest focus shifted from EU integration to broader demands for democratic reforms and Yanukovych’s resignation. Tensions between protesters and police escalated, setting the stage for further confrontations.

Russian allegations of U.S. involvement

Russia begins openly accusing the United States of interfering in Ukraine’s internal affairs. These claims followed public appearances by U.S. officials — most notably Assistant Secretary of State Victoria Nuland, who visited Kiev and distributed food to protesters in December 2013. Russian media and officials portrayed this as direct evidence of Western orchestration of the uprising.

From the Russian perspective, Euromaidan was a geopolitical project driven by Washington, not simply a domestic protest movement.

Leaked phone call Nuland - Pyatt

In early February 2014, a leaked phone conversation between U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Victoria Nuland and U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine Geoffrey Pyatt surfaced online. In this call, Nuland and Pyatt discussed their preferences for Ukraine's future leadership. Nuland expressed support for opposition leader Arseniy Yatsenyuk, stating he had the necessary economic and governing experience. She also suggested that Vitali Klitschko should stay out of the government, and discussed strategies for bringing in the United Nations to mediate the political transition. Notably, Nuland remarked, "F*** the EU," expressing frustration with the European Union's approach to the crisis. This conversation indicated a level of U.S. involvement in shaping the prospective Ukrainian government

Source: NPR

Russia sees this as direct evidence of U.S. government hand-picking the next government in Ukraine.

Financial aid

• In December 2013, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Victoria Nuland stated that since 1991, the U.S. had invested over $5 billion in Ukraine to promote democratic institutions, civil society, and good governance.

• Victoria Nuland, offered a $1 billion loan guarantee and the provision of non-lethal assistance to the Ukrainian military and border guard. Along with Secretary of State John Kerry and Secretary of Defense Ash Carter, she is seen as a leading supporter of defensive weapons delivery to Ukraine.

Source: Wikipedia

• Many "independent" media during the Maidan protests were funded by USAID or similar programs. Notable examples include:

  • $1.25 million to Ukrainian media project U-media from USAID
  • more than 1 million Ukrainian hryvnias to Hromadske.TV by US Embassy and the Netherlands Embassy
  • U.S. congress passing the "United States International Programming to Ukraine and Neighbouring Regions" act, authorizing $10 million for Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty and Voice of America to expand broadcasting in Ukraine

Source: USmission

Source: Wikipedia

Source: Wikipedia

Russian view and response

From Russia’s perspective, this level of U.S. involvement was seen as a blatant violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty. The leaked phone call and financial support for opposition-aligned media and civil society confirmed, in Moscow’s eyes, that the United States was actively engineering a regime change. These actions were not interpreted as democratic support, but as strategic interference.

Russia also viewed this as a breach of earlier diplomatic agreements, especially the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, in which Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity were guaranteed by signatories, including the U.S. and EU states. In Russia’s view, Western support for the Maidan uprising and the removal of President Yanukovych constituted a coup and a violation of Ukraine’s constitutional process.

This narrative became central to Russia’s justification for its subsequent actions in Crimea and eastern Ukraine, which Moscow framed as protective moves in response to Western-backed political destabilization.

Snipers open fire on Maidan

The deadliest day of the Maidan uprising. Amid chaos in central Kiev, at least one sniper—and likely more—opened fire on both protesters and police. The exact number of snipers and their locations remains unclear and widely disputed. On that day, around 50 protesters and 13 police officers were killed, with hundreds more injured.

Western governments and media quickly and publicly blamed government forces loyal to President Yanukovych. However, leaked phone calls between European officials raised the possibility that third-party or rogue elements may have been involved, noting that both protesters and police were shot, suggesting a more complex scenario.

Source: Europarl leaked conversation

Source: YouTube leaked conversation

From the Russian perspective, the timing and consequences of the violence made little strategic sense for the government, which was already under intense pressure. Moscow argues that firing on the crowd only served to delegitimize Yanukovych, accelerate his downfall, and benefit those seeking regime change.

Yanukovych removed

Although Viktor Yanukovych was removed by a majority vote in the Verkhovna Rada (Ukrainian parliament), several factors raise questions about the constitutionality of the process:

• The formal impeachment procedure outlined in Article 111 was not followed:
  • No official investigation was launched
  • No ruling was issued by the Constitutional Court
  • No impeachment trial took place
• Yanukovych never officially resigned and publicly claimed he remained Ukraine’s legitimate president
• Russia and some legal experts described the process as a coup or an extra-constitutional transfer of power

As a result, Russia views the removal as a Western-backed coup, marking a loss of Ukrainian sovereignty and the illegitimacy of the post-Maidan government.

Russian occupation of Crimea

From Russia’s perspective, the 2014 occupation and annexation of Crimea was a defensive and justified response to the unconstitutional overthrow of President Yanukovych and the emergence of a Western-backed, nationalist-leaning government in Kiev. Russia claimed it acted to protect ethnic Russians and Russian-speaking citizens in Crimea, who it believed were threatened by rising anti-Russian sentiment. The region also held immense strategic importance, being home to Russia’s Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol. Russia framed its intervention as a move to prevent NATO expansion into Crimea and to safeguard regional stability.

Sevastopol Naval base

The Sevastopol naval base in Crimea holds critical strategic value for Russia as the home of its Black Sea Fleet, providing vital access to the Black Sea, the Mediterranean, and global sea lanes. Historically a key military hub since the Tsarist era, Sevastopol allows Russia to project naval power in southeastern Europe, the Middle East, and beyond. After the Soviet Union's collapse, Russia continued to lease the base from Ukraine under long-term agreements.

However, following the 2014 political upheaval in Kiev, Russia feared that a new pro-Western government might terminate the lease or invite NATO forces into Crimea. Although NATO had no formal military presence in the Black Sea at the time—due in part to restrictions under the Montreux Convention—Russian leadership believed that Ukrainian NATO membership could eventually open the door to a permanent Western naval foothold in the region. From Moscow’s view, this posed a direct threat to its military posture and strategic depth.

While Russia had been developing an alternative base in Novorossiysk, it lacked Sevastopol’s advantages: it was less geographically favorable, more exposed to harsh weather, and not as well-equipped for large-scale operations. Other options in the Black Sea were either geopolitically unreliable or lacked sufficient naval infrastructure.

Thus, securing full control over Sevastopol through the annexation of Crimea was seen as a necessary move to preserve strategic stability, maintain operational reach, and prevent further Western military encroachment in a region critical to Russia’s national security.

Cultural and demographic concerns

Besides the strategic value of Crimea, there were cultural and demographic concerns:

• There was a fear that ethnic Russians and Russian-speaking citizens in Crimea (who made up over 60% of the population) would face discrimination or repression.
• Attempts were made by the new authorities to repeal the 2012 language law that allowed Russian to be used as a regional language, further fueling these fears.
• Fear of far-right or (ultra)nationalist deep influence in west-Ukrainian politics
  • Svoboda party's far-right origins: The political party Svoboda originated as the Social-National Party of Ukraine, a name reminiscent of "National Socialism." It adopted symbols similar to those used by neo-Nazi groups. In 2004, under the leadership of Oleh Tyahnybok, the party rebranded as Svoboda, attempting to moderate its image. However, its past affiliations and rhetoric continued to draw scrutiny.
  • The Azov Battalion: formed in 2014, was composed of members from far-right groups such as the Social-National Assembly and Patriot of Ukraine. The battalion's insignia resembled the Nazi Wolfsangel symbol, and many members had ties to neo-Nazi ideologies.
  • Right Sector: a coalition of far-right groups, played a significant role during the Euromaidan protests. They were among the most organized and confrontational factions, often leading clashes with police. Their presence and actions were highlighted in various media reports, noting their influence during the unrest.
• After Yanukovych fled, central authority in Ukraine was seen by Russia as chaotic and illegitimate, Russia argued that Crimea had the right to protect itself and decide its own future.
• Crimea had a long history of pro-Russian political leanings, and many residents were ethnic Russians, with close ties to Russia culturally. Russia framed the takeover as a response to the will of the people. This view is also based on the earlier attempts by Crimea to become independent of Ukraine:
  • In 1991 Crimea held a referendum in which over 93% voted to re-establish the Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic.
  • In 1992, the Crimean parliament declared independence and adopted a constitution stating Crimea was a sovereign state. It scheduled a referendum to confirm this status. The Ukrainian parliament reacted by annulling the declaration and threatening to dissolve Crimea's parliament.
  • In 1994, Yuri Meshkov, a pro-Russian politician, was elected President of Crimea. Meshkov sought to align Crimea more closely with Russia, introducing Moscow time and attempting to implement Russian law. The Ukrainian parliament responded by abolishing the Crimean presidency, suspending its constitution and reasserting full control of the region.
  • Between 1996 and 2013 various local parties and leaders pushed for stronger ties with Russia or greater autonomy.

Russian domestic support

Vladimir Putin is often solely blamed by the west for the occupation and annexation of Crimea, but the move was also overwhelmingly supported by the Russian population. Many Russians saw it as a patriotic act that corrected a historical mistake and protected fellow Russians. The annexation sparked a surge in national pride and unity, with public celebrations across the country. As a result, Putin’s approval ratings soared, climbing above 80% and marking one of the most popular moments of his presidency. The event reinforced his image as a decisive leader defending Russian identity and strategic interests.

First sanctions against Russia

Following the Crimean occupation, the EU and other NATO-members introduced the first batches of sanctions against Russia.

Donetsk people's republic (DPR)

Pro-Russian separatists, consisting mostly of miners and other local residents, storm the government buildings and declare independence of the DPR.

Source: Guardian

Anti-Terrorist Operation (ATO)

The ATO is started by the interim government in Kiev. The primary objective of the ATO was to restore control over the territories occupied by separatists.

Ukrainian forces included the regular army, National guard, volunteer battalions, and police units. The operation focused on retaking cities like Sloviansk, Kramatorsk, and Mariupol.

Russia condemned the ATO as an assault on civilians, accusing Ukraine of using military force against its own people. Some noteworthy events and battles are listed below.

Siege of Sloviansk (April 12 – July 5, 2014)

The ATO started with the Siege of Sloviansk on the same day. Ukrainian forces launched operations to retake the city of Sloviansk, culminating in the separatists withdrawal on July 5. This marked the start of the armed conflict in Donbass. Both sides lost roughly 50 military personnel.

Notably Ukrainian forces employed artillery and airstrikes in efforts to dislodge separatists, leading to significant infrastructure damage and civilian displacement.

Raid of the 95th Brigade (July – August 2014)

The Ukrainian 95th Airmobile Brigade conducted a 470-kilometer raid through separatist-held territories, engaging in multiple battles. Considered one of the longest armored raids in military history.

Battle of Ilovaisk (August – early September 2014)

Ukrainian forces attempted to encircle and reclaim Ilovaisk but were themselves encircled by separatist and Russian regular troops. After a failed negotiated withdrawal, Ukrainian troops suffered heavy casualties.

Battle of Donetsk Airport (May 2014 – January 2015)

Ukrainian forces defended Donetsk International Airport against prolonged assaults by separatist forces. Despite initial successes, Ukrainian troops were eventually overrun after months of intense fighting.

Battle of Debaltseve (January – February 2015)

Debaltseve, a strategic railway hub, was contested fiercely. Ukrainian forces were eventually encircled and forced to retreat. The battle concluded with significant Ukrainian losses.

Humanitarian reports

According to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), from April 14, 2014, to December 31, 2021, the conflict in eastern Ukraine resulted in an estimated 51,000 to 54,000 total casualties. This includes 14,200–14,400 people killed, among them at least 3,404 civilians, approximately 4,400 Ukrainian military personnel, and an estimated 6,500 members of armed groups.

In addition, between 37,000 and 39,000 were injured, including 7,000–9,000 civilians, 13,800–14,200 Ukrainian forces, and 15,800–16,200 separatist fighters. Most of these losses occurred during the initial peak of the conflict in 2014–2015.

Source: OHCHR

Other reports highlight the displacement of civilians from the DPR and LPR, with the majority expressing a preference for relocating to Russian territory. Out of more than 1.3 million displaced Ukrainians, around 800,000 sought asylum, including approximately 659,143 who moved to Russia and 81,100 to Belarus. Meanwhile, an estimated 2.7 million people remained living in DPR and LPR-controlled areas during this period.

Source: OCHA (PDF)

Source: euronews

Source: Wikipedia

Many Russians perceive this as a tragic loss of over 20,000 compatriots—their own people—who died defending their homeland against a hostile aggressor.

Luhansk people's republic (LPR)

A group of armed separatists, occupy the regional administration building in Luhansk. Declaring LPR independence on camera and forming a "people's council". The announcement of LPR significantly escalated the ATO.

Minsk I

Representatives of Ukraine, Russia, the OSCE, and leaders of the self-declared DPR and LPR signed a document Aimed to establish a ceasefire and a peace roadmap — but failed quickly due to ongoing fighting.

Odessa Clashes and Trade union house fire

On May 2, 2014, the city of Odesa, Ukraine, experienced one of the deadliest incidents of the post-Euromaidan period. Clashes between pro-Ukrainian (pro-Maidan) and pro-Russian (anti-Maidan) activists escalated into violence, culminating in a tragic fire at the Trade Unions House.

As tensions escalated, pro-maidan protesters reportedly threw Molotov cocktails. A fire broke out inside the building to which the anti-Maidan protesters had retreated, rapidly spreading through its upper floors. Many inside were trapped by smoke and flames, while others jumped from windows in desperate attempts to escape. According to official reports, 48 people died, with 42 perishing in the fire. Most of the victims were anti-Maidan activists.

Russian officials and media described the fire as a massacre and compared it to Nazi atrocities. This narrative fueled sentiment and caused a public outcry in Russia. From the Russian perspective this was a clear sign of the danger pro-Russians on Ukrainian territory were in.

Donetsk Bus Station Attack

A devastating attack took place at the Donetskhirmash public transport stop in the Leninskyi District of Donetsk at approximately 8:30 AM. Mortar shells struck a trolleybus and the surrounding area, killing at least 8 civilians and injuring 13 others. The attack occurred in a densely populated zone under the control of pro-Russian separatists.

The incident drew widespread condemnation and sparked calls for independent investigations. Ukrainian authorities labeled it a terrorist act, while pro-Russian separatists blamed Ukrainian forces. International organizations such as the OSCE and Human Rights Watch conducted investigations that pointed to shelling from separatist-held territory, which only deepened controversy.

From the Russian perspective, this attack further eroded trust in international investigations, which were seen as biased or politically motivated. Many in Russia viewed the incident as part of a pattern of indiscriminate attacks common throughout the Donbas conflict and interpreted it as yet another example of the chaos and suffering inflicted on civilians in the region.

Minsk II

The Minsk II Agreement, was a renewed attempt to end the conflict in eastern Ukraine after the failure of the first Minsk accord. Brokered by France and Germany under the Normandy Format, it involved Ukraine, Russia, the OSCE, and leaders of the self-declared DPR and LPR. The agreement included provisions for an immediate ceasefire, withdrawal of heavy weapons, release of prisoners, and eventual constitutional reforms in Ukraine to grant greater autonomy to separatist-held regions. While the fighting slowed, key provisions—such as full Ukrainian control over its borders and local elections under Ukrainian law—were never fully implemented. Both sides accused each other of violating the terms, and the deal effectively froze the conflict without resolving its core political issues.

Large-scale Russian military exercise

Russia initiated a significant military buildup near Ukraine's borders, marking the largest mobilization since 2014. By mid-April, approximately 100,000 to 120,000 troops were stationed along the border, raising international concerns about potential escalation. Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu confirmed the deployment of two combined arms armies and three airborne formations to the western border as part of readiness checks.

Military infrastructure and logistics

Russia began pre-positioning equipment, fuel, medical supplies, and blood banks — signs of preparation for sustained combat. Satellite imagery and intel showed military camps, tent cities, and logistics hubs being constructed near the Ukrainian border and in Belarus.

Russian Special Military Operation (SMO)

In the first days of the Special Military Operation (SMO) launched on February 24, 2022, much of the Russian population was shocked and unprepared for the scale and immediacy of the invasion. While there had been weeks of troop buildups, official rhetoric had downplayed the likelihood of full-scale war, and many Russians expected diplomatic maneuvering—not missiles hitting Kiev and tanks crossing borders from multiple directions. The announcement by President Putin in the early morning hours, framing the operation as a mission to "demilitarize and de-Nazify Ukraine," came as a surprise to the public, triggering confusion, concern, and disbelief.

Despite clear military signals in late 2021 and early 2022—such as massive troop movements, logistical staging, and failed negotiations—many Russians had not mentally prepared for war. The state media narrative had long focused on Western aggression and Ukraine's internal issues but stopped short of preparing society for a full invasion. The result was a population caught off guard, with a mix of reactions ranging from patriotic support, to quiet disapproval, and in some circles, open protest. The abrupt transition from political standoff to full military engagement marked a profound turning point, not just geopolitically, but also in the domestic psyche of Russia.

3 day war

In contrast to the widespread Western narrative of a “3-day war”, many Russians did not believe that the conflict in Ukraine would be quick or easily won. While some Western analysts and media speculated early on that Russia aimed to seize Kiev within days and install a new government, this assumption was never a mainstream belief inside Russia. From the outset of the Special Military Operation (SMO), many Russians—especially those with military awareness—understood the scale, complexity, and resistance involved in such an operation.

The shock of the first days was quickly replaced by a realization that the conflict would be protracted, especially as reports of fierce Ukrainian resistance, logistical challenges, and mounting casualties began to circulate. Russian commentary and analysis soon reflected the expectation of a long-term geopolitical confrontation, not just with Ukraine, but with the broader West. The “3-day war” idea, while popularized abroad, did not shape Russian public sentiment or strategic thinking in the same way.

Evidence:

• Russia was clearly prepared for a protracted artillery war, consistent with its military doctrine. The heavy use of artillery and rocket systems from the very beginning indicates a strategic orientation toward long-term, high-intensity combat, not a quick blitz-style campaign.

• A frequent claim in Western media is that Russia deployed riot police (Rosgvardiya) in anticipation of a quick occupation. However, there were practical reasons for their presence. In many areas, local civilians blocked roads and even tanks, making it logical to deploy riot control forces alongside regular troops for crowd management and rear-area security, not as an indication of underestimating resistance.

• No Russian official has ever stated that the operation was intended to last only three days. The only often-cited remark comes from Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko, who casually mentioned such a timeframe long before the conflict. However, this was an offhand comment, and its context and intent were not aligned with any official Russian planning or messaging.

Kiev surrounded, Mariupol captured

In the early phase of the conflict, Russian forces advanced toward Kyiv, not necessarily to seize the capital immediately, but to spread chaos, stretch Ukrainian defenses, and destroy key assets deep inland. This maneuver also allowed Russia to mount direct pressure on Ukraine’s leadership, forcing Kyiv into a defensive posture and increasing the likelihood of early negotiations on favorable terms. While Ukrainian forces focused on defending the capital, Russia concentrated efforts in the south, enabling the encirclement and eventual capture of Mariupol. This was critical in securing the land bridge between Crimea and the Donbas, dramatically improving Russia’s strategic depth and logistical control in the region.

Evidence Russia never planned to take Kiev:

• Historical significance: Kiev is one of the most important cities in the shared Russian-Ukrainian history, often referred to as the cradle of the Rus civilization. Damaging it or occupying it militarily would have been deeply unpopular among the Russian population.

• Insufficient troop presence: The number of Russian troops positioned around Kiev was far too small for a full urban assault. Given Russia's extensive and recent military expertise in urban warfare, especially in Syria, Chechnya and Donbass, this likely reflects intentional restraint, not a miscalculation.

• Timing of withdrawal: Russian forces withdrew from the Kiev region almost immediately after Mariupol was secured, indicating that their northern push had fulfilled its purpose as a diversion and pressure tactic, not as a genuine attempt at occupation.

• Strategic emphasis on the land bridge: The Ukrainian counter-offensive in 2023, which was heavily influenced by NATO planning, focused intensely on trying to break the land bridge between Crimea and Donbas. This highlights just how strategically vital that corridor is—and suggests that its capture was Russia’s main objective from the start of the operation.

• No battles lost: Despite suffering casualties, Russia did not lose any battles during the initial phase of the operation—including the battle for Hostomel Airport, which was heavily contested but ultimately secured and held by Russian forces as a key strategic foothold near Kyiv.

Russian public sentiment

Inside Russia, public reactions to the invasion were mixed and complex. While many supported the military operation on patriotic or security grounds, there was also an internal debate over its effectiveness and execution. A common sentiment—even among supporters—was that Russia had been too soft and restrained, particularly in how it conducted the war. Many Russians criticized the government for avoiding strikes on Ukraine’s critical infrastructure—such as energy grids, railway networks, roads, and bridges—despite having the military capability to disable them. Instead, the vast majority of destruction remained confined to front-line areas, which left some questioning the seriousness of the operation.

This restraint stood in stark contrast to other conflicts: for example, in just one month of Israel’s 2023 campaign in Gaza, over 11,000 civilians were reported killed, whereas in the entire first year of Russia’s operation in Ukraine, UN figures recorded approximately 8,000 civilian deaths. For many Russians, this comparison underscored the belief that the Kremlin was holding back, whether due to strategic calculation, political concern, or humanitarian optics.

Initially, the Russian public was fearful, worried about the potential for mass mobilization, economic collapse, and extreme consequences from Western sanctions. However, those fears settled down fairly quickly. As time passed and the effects of the sanctions turned out to be manageable, public confidence grew. The sentiment not only returned to a more positive outlook, but President Putin's popularity soared, with many viewing him as a strategic mastermind who had accurately predicted and prepared for the geopolitical fallout.

Mobilization

The topic of Russian mobilization has been widely misunderstood and often misrepresented in Western media. Contrary to claims of mass or forced mobilization, Russia has not carried out any forceful nationwide conscription. The only regions that have conducted forced mobilization were the DPR and LPR, which, as independent entities prior to their integration, operated under Ukrainian law

Istanbul peace negotiations

Following the initial phase of Russia's military operation in Ukraine, particularly after the advance toward Kyiv, significant peace negotiations took place between Russian and Ukrainian delegations. One of the most notable rounds of talks occurred in Istanbul, Turkey.

Russia presented several key demands aimed at resolving the conflict. These demands were central to Russia's vision for Ukraine's future geopolitical alignment and internal policies:

1. Neutrality and Non-NATO Status: Russia insisted that Ukraine commit to a neutral stance, explicitly renouncing any aspirations to join NATO. This would involve constitutional amendments to enshrine Ukraine's non-aligned status.

2. Demilitarization: Moscow called for significant reductions in Ukraine's military capabilities, including limitations on the size and scope of its armed forces, to ensure that Ukraine would not pose a military threat to Russia.

3. Recognition of Crimea and Donbas: Russia demanded that Ukraine officially recognize Crimea as part of the Russian Federation and acknowledge the independence of the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics.

4. Russian Language Rights: Ensuring the protection and official status of the Russian language within Ukraine was a priority for Russia, seeking guarantees for the rights of Russian-speaking citizens.

5. Security Guarantees: Russia proposed that Ukraine receive security assurances from a group of countries, including Russia itself, to guarantee Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity under the new terms.

Russia promised immediate and full withdrawal from all areas not mentioned in these points if Ukraine signed the document.

U.K. forces end to negotiations

The document required 2 signatures, a preliminary one and a definitive. Ukraine signed the preliminary signature and wen on to discuss the document internally. However, evidently, Boris Johnson stepped in and prevented the signature of the document, proclaiming they are going to war.

Evidence

• Former Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett: Bennett was personally present during the Istanbul negotiations and said in an interview that Ukraine was ready to go for Neutrality and demilitarization but western forces decided to keep the war going, specifically mentioning Boris Johnson. Ben

Source: YouTube Bennett interview

• Former German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder: Who was involved in mediation efforts between Russia and Ukraine stated: "At the peace negotiations in Istanbul in March 2022 with [the now Defence Minister of Ukraine] Rustem Umerov, the Ukrainians did not agree on peace because they were not allowed to. For everything they discussed, they first had to ask the Americans"

Source: intellinews

• David Arakhamia, head of Ukraine's delegation: famously stated that not only were Ukrainians fully prepared to sign the document and that the Russian document was considered fair. But that Boris Johnson in person thwarted any signing.

Video link: Youtube

Russia's Public Sentiment

The collapse of peace negotiations—caused by the United States and the United Kingdom—deepened the public conviction that Ukraine had lost its sovereignty and was now fully under Western control. For many Russians, this confirmed the view that the conflict was not simply a war with Ukraine, but a full-scale proxy war between Russia and the U.S., fought on Ukrainian territory. Any lingering doubts among the Russian public about U.S. involvement in the 2014 Maidan revolution were largely erased. It was now broadly seen as part of a long-term strategy to destabilize Russia by using Ukraine as a geopolitical tool, effectively setting Slavic nations against one another. As these beliefs solidified, Putin’s popularity soared, reaching approval levels of around 90%, with many viewing him as a leader who had accurately warned the nation for years. By this point, public consensus in Russia was firmly behind him, with little to no internal dissent regarding the legitimacy of his stance.

Ukraine's argument on stopping negotiation

Later, the Ukrainian delegation backpedaled, claiming that Russia was not to be trusted, and that any agreement would have been meaningless. However, this raises an important question: what exactly did Ukraine have to lose by signing? A ceasefire would have clearly been in Ukraine's immediate advantage, halting the fighting and preserving lives. If the argument was that Russia might not follow through, then signing still posed no real risk—either Russia withdrew as promised, or nothing changed. Moreover, as the conflict has continued, Russia has already achieved nearly all the core demands outlined in the original negotiation document, further proving that it was both willing and capable of enforcing its position. This makes the refusal to sign appear, in retrospect, strategically questionable.

Trump stops USAID

After President Trump officially ended USAID, a wave of previously undisclosed financial data was declassified or leaked, revealing the full scale of its global operations. It became known that billions had been funneled annually into foreign media, civil society groups, and political consultancies—particularly in countries of geopolitical interest like Ukraine. Reports showed that 9 out of 10 Ukrainian media outlets had received USAID-linked funding, sparking renewed criticism from Russia and others who saw this not as media development, but as information warfare under a humanitarian guise.

USAID had long been active in Ukraine, with deep involvement in the Orange Revolution (2004) and Euromaidan (2013–2014). Russian analysts argue that these events, often celebrated in the West as democratic uprisings, were in fact heavily orchestrated with Western financial and logistical support. Through grants, training, and operational resources, USAID-backed NGOs and media played an outsized role in steering public sentiment and organizing dissent. In the aftermath of Trump's decision, critics pointed to these revelations as proof of systemic foreign interference, framing USAID less as an aid agency and more as a strategic arm of U.S. influence.

Source: Guardian

Source: RSF